It became clear that the enormous corporations that control the agricultural inputs did not want to see farmers organizing themselves into a business organization. To do so meant that they might have to give up some of their profits, the very profits that had turned them into global giants.

The fight for control of the enormous amount of revenues gained from agriculture (about $700 billion dollars in North America) has seen these companies merge and consolidate. As they do so, on-farm profitability reduces and the farmers, as a fragmented marketplace, have to deal in a less competitive environment.

At first the major manufacturers of farm inputs ignored FNA, seeing it only as a farmer buying group. In fact, many farmers had the same view. Fortunately,not too many.

When FNA approached manufacturers the reaction was to refuse to deal with us, believing that by ignoring us, FNA would “just go away.”

But FNA quickly gained members and by the end of 1999 had over 500 representing over 1.2 million acres. By that time, there were some suppliers dealing with the organization and FNA was able to offer farm fuel, harvest parts, and a small array of other inputs through our Preferred Suppliers. A member could now at least save their membership fee making it easier to justify in a farm management budget.

Despite this first year of success, the industry saw FNA as a looming threat and they more pointedly denied access to product or to offer price quotes when FNA tendered volume purchases.

It seemed as if all the big players in agricultural inputs had attended a meeting where they decided to destroy FNA, actively generating gossip that ranged from mythical (“FNA will destroy all the local dealers”) to plain mean-spirited (“They’re in it for themselves.”)

Despite the lies and rumours that these companies tried to spread, enough farmers had the sense to see through it and by the end of 2000, FNA boasted over 1200 members and almost three million acres.

In 1999, FNA negotiated a deal with an independent bulk fuel wholesaler. During the trial period in the last few months of the season, FNA members purchased 250,000 litres. In April, 2002, a new record was set when almost 2.5 million litres moved through the FNA office in only four days. The fuel program proved a turning point for FNA. It gave credibility to the organization and provided the base for stronger negotiations with other suppliers. Today, FNA continues to deliver fuel to members across the prairies and is working on fuel programs for Ontario and British Columbia.

While FNA continued to grow, it became clear that a new tactic had to be employed to leverage price reductions in crop protection products for members. In December 2004, FNA purchased a chemical dealership, BSC Chemicals. The dealership had done about a million dollars in sales the previous year. FNA in its first four months of operations did $3 million in sales at much lower prices than previously offered.

FNA felt that having demonstrated to the suppliers that we could actually move more of their products, while providing better margins for farmers everyone would be happy and prepared to grow our relationships. On that basis, four months after buying BSC, FNA disclosed to the industry that it, FNA, was the owner of BSC. Ten days later FNA received letters from all three distributors, namely Univar, UAP and InterAg that they were cutting off all access to product.

FNA was left with no crop protection products for its members. These farmers then were forced by this combined action of the suppliers, to purchase their inputs at the higher prices.

The refusal to supply, in such a coordinated manner, appears to us to be clearly anti-competitive and for that reason we have made application to the Competition Bureau to remedy the situation. Almost two years later the case remains unresolved. One of the reasons the case languishes reveals just how much power suppliers can exercise even indirectly…

Apparently any number. FNA has approached many firms that specialize in competition law to try to obtain the expertise necessary to try our case against the suppliers. In every case, within days of retaining a firm FNA is notified that the law firm has “learned” that they cannot represent us as it conflicts with one of their other clients in the agriculture supply industry.

We have faced similar problems in retaining counsel for intellectual property issues. It seems that when you get to the size of some of these conglomerates, you have the ability to drop retainers in every major law firm in the country – simply to prevent farmers from getting expert legal services.

Even the nature of some government regulations demonstrates the power the major agriculture suppliers can exert.

In 1993 as part of a major redesign of pesticide law and regulations, the Canadian market became tightly insulated from price competition. When producer groups of the day pointed out that in protecting the chemical companies, the government was making Canadian producers uncompetitive with those in other countries where competition on input prices was a reality.

In response the crop protection industry, represented by the predecessor to CropLife, voluntarily agreed to a provision known as the Own Use Import rule.

Under this rule, farmers would be allowed to import chemically equivalent pesticides for their own use on their own land. This, said the chemical companies and the government of the day, would provide a safety valve against excessive pricing in the Canadian market.

So why didn’t it work? In creating the rule the chemical companies in partnership with the government designed it so that no one producer would ever be able to make use of the rule in practice. First, it required expensive laboratory tests to prove that a chemical the farmer wanted to import was “equivalent” to one already registered in . Secondly, navigating the regulatory system to get a certification of equivalency is not something the average farmer sees himself spending a weekend on.

The rule was passed in 1993 and FNA came into existence in 1998. By 1999 FNA had identified this rule and started to try to get ClearOut41 Plus certified equivalent. It took six years of testing, haggling with government officials, and avoiding offensives by vested interests. But in 2005, FNA succeeded in getting the equivalency certificate and began the process of helping members obtain glyphosate at greatly reduced prices.

When FNA started the glyphosate program, prices in the Canadian market ranged from $6.50 to $10.50 per liter. FNA brought it in at $4.25 per liter. In 18 months, 20% of the Canadian market for glyphosate had moved to ClearOut41 Plus and the Canadian manufacturers were forced to respond by reducing prices for everyone. Depending on how you do the calculations, the savings to Canadian farmers have been between $60 million and $120 million.

Losing that amount of money to farmers was not something the industry would take lightly. Led by their lobby organization, CropLife, the chemical industry launched an offensive against FNA and the Own Use Import Program itself.

Regarding FNA, dealers were telling producers that ClearOut 41 was “garbage” product, that it wouldn’t do the job the $10 glyphosate would do, that it couldn’t be counted on to be consistent. In addition to outright slander, gimmicks were employed where two jars of glyphosate would be shown to a producer, with one cloudy and the other clear with the claim that this proved how bad ClearOut 41 is. But the smear campaign was too late. Too many producers had used the product with outstanding results for the coffee row attacks to succeed.

CropLife turned its attention to a public relations and government lobbying campaign. Its president, Lorne Hepworth, went on radio telling the public that there were “concerns” about the environmental safety of the program, “regulatory soundness” of the OUI program and numerous other objections.

CropLife got the ear of the federal government in the form of the Pesticide Management Regulatory Agency, which itself had shown signs that it wished the OUI program had never been available to farmers.

Which brings us to the present in which the PMRA has appointed a “Task Force” to review OUI. As a participant on the Task Force, FNA is forbidden from discussing the details until the final report is issued. But no mistake, we are there with one purpose – to defend the right of producers to have competitive pricing among farm inputs, not just on the products they grow.

FNA has proven that farmers can win, even against the most powerful corporations in the world. We have shown that there is a battle plan for the future that can have and has had a direct positive impact on farm incomes.

FNA now represents over 12 million acres of land and 7,500 farm families. We are adding members and benefits every day.

We provide reduced cost inputs ranging from oil to welders.

We have an entire department of professional agrologists dedicated to serving FNA members, a professional team to recruit new members, crop protection specialists of our own and some of the best international negotiators, government regulatory experts, and corporate development specialists in the country.

And we have programs to build for the future with our entire concentration on that single reason we exist: